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STATE CF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Appellee, Case No, 920473-CA 
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Defendant-Appellant 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
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inferences that can be reasonably drawn from it, [the appellate 
court] conclude[s] that some evidence exists from which a 
reasonable jury could find that the elements of the crime had 
been proven beyond a reasonable doubt." Ibid. The trial court's 
determination concerning a motion to dismiss or for a directed 
verdict is a question of law. State v. Rivenburah, 11 Utah 2d 
95, 110, 355 P.2d 689, 698-99 (1960), cert, denied, 386 U.S. 922, 
82 S. Ct. 246 (1961). The trial court's legal conclusion is not 
accorded any particular deference and is reviewed for its 
correctness. City of Monticello v. Christensen, 788 P.2d 513, 
516 (Utah 1990), cert, denied. 111 S. Ct. 120 (1990). 
2. Was there sufficient evidence to support the jury's 
verdict that defendant was guilty of aggravated assault? When 
challenging the jury's verdict, the defendant must show that the 
evidence and its inferences are so "inconclusive or inherently 
improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of which 
he was convicted." State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 
1983). "[S]o long as some evidence and reasonable inferences 
support the jury's findings, [the appellate court] will not 
disturb them. See State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah 
1985)." State v. Moore, 802 P.2d 732, 738 (Utah App. 1990). To 
meet this burden, defendant must marshal all the evidence in 
support of the verdict and then demonstrate that even viewing it 
in the light most favorable to the verdict below, the evidence is 
insufficient to support the verdict. Failure to so marshal the 
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evidence waives an appellant's right to have his claim of 
insufficiency considered on appeal. J[d. at 738-39. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Determinative constitutional provisions, statutes and 
rules are compiled in Addendum A where not set forth in the body 
of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Danny L. Herring, was charged by information 
with one count of obstruction of justice, a first degree felony, 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-306 (1990) (Count I), and 
one count of aggravated assault, a third degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (1990) (Count II) (R. 1). 
Defendant's case was tried before a jury. Defendant made a 
motion to dismiss at the close of the State's case, which was 
preserved by the trial court (T. 330-31). At the close of all 
the evidence, defendant renewed his motion to dismiss, claiming 
the State had failed to present a prima facie case on both counts 
of the information (T. 423-39). At the same time, defendant also 
moved to dismiss or for a directed verdict, based on the evidence 
that had been presented as a whole (T. 439-40). The trial court 
took all defendant's motions under advisement (T. 439-40). 
The jury acquitted defendant of obstruction of justice 
and convicted him of aggravated assault (R. 185-86). Thereafter, 
the trial court denied both of defendant's motions to dismiss and 
for a directed verdict (Ruling on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss 
or in the Alternative Motion for Directed Verdict of Acquittal, 
3 
attached at Addendum B, R. 207-08). Defendant was sentenced to a 
term of imprisonment, not to exceed five years, in the Utah State 
Prison (R. 218-220). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On the morning of July 6, 1991, Troy Lott met his 
friend, Kevin Ericksen, to help him in bringing some of the 
Ericksen family's livestock to auction (T. 106). They were 
accompanied by another friend, Scott Carlisle, with whom they 
drank most of a case of beer in the course of the day (T. 107). 
When they returned at about 3:00 to 4:00 p.m., defendant, a 
friend of all three men, had already arrived at the Ericksen farm 
(T. 108). Soon thereafter, the beer having been already 
substantially consumed, defendant and Carlisle left to purchase 
more alcohol, returning with a one-half gallon bottle of vodka 
(T. 108-09, 335-37). 
All four men, though Carlisle to a lesser extent, 
proceeded to drink the vodka (T. 110-12). Defendant testified 
that he had less than a glass of vodka (T. 337-38). In the 
course of the afternoon the men engaged in a friendly water fight 
amongst themselves and Ericksenrs young nieces and nephew, during 
which time the bottle was consumed (T. 111-12, 338-40). 
Carlisle left at about 5:00 p.m., at about which time 
defendant and Ericksen got into a shoving match (T. 112-13). 
Lott interceded, but Ericksen only continued to shove Lott in the 
same way (T. 113). Feeling endangered, and seeing that Ericksen 
would not respond to his requests to stop, Lott punched Ericksen 
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twice in the face, knocking him to the ground (T. 113-14). Lott 
then felt two strikes from behind and turned to see defendant in 
a fighting stance (T. 114, 140). Although Lott thought that 
defendant hit him with his fists, Nicole Stickney, one of 
Ericksen's nieces who had played in the water fight, testified 
that defendant struck Lott by delivering two high kicks to the 
back of Lott's head (T. 123, 170, 185-86). 
Seeing himself outnumbered as Ericksen arose from the 
ground, Lott ran to the Ericksens' pickup truck and jumped into 
the bed of the truck (T. 110, 114). Defendant and Ericksen 
jumped in right after him (T. 115). Ericksen repeatedly hit Lott 
on his shoulders and ribs (T. 115). Although Lott did not recall 
being hit by Ericksen in any other way, Nicole testified that she 
saw Ericksen throw one of the fifty-gallon steel drums, weighing 
thirty to forty pounds, that was in the truck down into the bed 
(T. 147-48, 173-74). 
As Lott lay on his side, hoping that Ericksen would 
stop hitting him, he looked up at defendant, who then kicked him 
straight in the face once and then within seconds a second time 
(T. 115-17, 142-43). Lott then jumped out of the truck and 
headed down the lane, followed by defendant and Ericksen, until 
he ran into Mike Morgan, Utah County Deputy Sheriff, who just 
happened to be near the Ericksen property on another assignment 
(T. 118, 124-25, 187-90).2 Lott had black eyes for a week after 
1
 Defendant's subsequent interactions with law enforcement 
officials bear on the obstruction of justice charge. Since 
defendant was acquitted of that charge and no issue relating to 
5 
the attack, though he acknowedged that he suffered no permanent 
scarring or injuries and that he did not go to a hospital for 
treatment (T. 119, 144). 
Deputy Sheriff Morgan testified that Lott's face was 
covered with blood and that he was bleeding "quite a bit" 
(T. 191, 195). State's exhibits 2 through 5, photographs taken 
the following day, depict Lott's facial injuries (State's 
Exhibits 2 through 5; T. 87-88). Detective Scott Carter of the 
Utah County Sheriff's Office, who took the photographs, stated 
that he considered Lott's injuries, "fairly major marks" (T. 96). 
The State called Dr. Elmo Gruwell, emergency room 
physician at Utah Valley Regional Medical Center, as its expert, 
non-treating physician to testify concerning the likelihood that 
defendant's kicking Lott in the head would cause serious bodily 
injury (T. 286-87). Referring to exhibit 2, Dr. Gruwell 
acknowledged that the injury shown in exhibit 2 was to the 
forehead, the most protected area of the head (T. 298). However, 
he also noted that the injuries depicted were "caused by a 
significant force" and if applied to a different part of the face 
could definitely have caused serious bodily injury (T. 306). 
From exhibit 3, Dr. Gruwell noted that Lott had also suffered 
injuries to his ear and temple, causing swelling in the area of 
his temple (T. 306-07). 
In response to a hypothetical question, Dr. Gruwell 
testified to a variety of possible injuries and the consequences 
it is raised on appeal, facts relating to it are omitted. 
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of blows to different parts of the face and head, including a 
blow to the temple near the ear, the weakest portion of the skull 
protecting the brain (T. 289-97). Dr. Gruwell explained that the 
middle menigeal artery might be sheared by such a blow which 
could cause an epidural bleed, leading to death within twenty-
four hours if not treated (T. 294). Treatment would require a 
craniotomy or open brain operation, from which most people 
survive but which leaves most with residual problems, including 
seizure disorders or motor deficits on one side of the body, loss 
of coordination and strength (T. 295). 
Defendant testified that he kicked Lott in the back to 
defend himself from Lott's first throwing a punch at him which 
"scuffed" across his head (T. 342-43). Deputy Sheriff Morgan, 
however, noticed no signs on defendant's face that he had been in 
a fight, but that defendant's knuckles were scraped and bore 
contusions (T. 195-98). Defendant also stated that he never 
intended to do any physical harm and that his kicking Lott was 
the result of his recovering his balance as he attempted not to 
kick Lott but to deliver "a tap up the side of the head" (T. 349, 
356-58). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The standard of review applied to determining whether 
the trial court has properly denied a defendant's motion to 
dismiss, and whether there is sufficient evidence to support a 
jury's guilty verdict is essentially the same, i.e., does there 
exist some evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that 
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the elements of the crime had been proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt. In this case the evidence supports both of these 
challenges made by defendant on appeal. There was evidence 
showing that defendant intentionally kicked the victim directly 
in the face and the temple, from which blows it was reasonably 
likely that the victim could have suffered severe bodily injury. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S 
MOTIONS TO DISMISS BECAUSE THE PROSECUTION 
PRODUCED "SOME EVIDENCE" OF EVERY ELEMENT OF 
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, WHICH WAS ALSO SUFFICIENT 
TO SUPPORT THE JURY'S VERDICT OF GUILT. 
"A defendant's motion to dismiss for insufficient 
evidence at the conclusion of the State's case in chief requires 
the trial court to determine whether the defendant must proceed 
with the introduction of evidence in his defense." State v. 
Noren, 704 P.2d 568, 570 (Utah 1985) (per curiam) (citing State 
v. Smith, Utah, 675 P.2d 521 (1983)). See also Utah R. Crim. P. 
17(o);2 Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-3 (1990)3. "In order to submit a 
2
 Rule 17, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, provides, in 
pertinent part: 
(o) At the conclusion of the evidence by 
the prosecution, or at the conclusion of all 
the evidence, the court may issue an order 
dismissing any information or indictment, or 
any count thereof, upon the ground that the 
evidence is not legally sufficient to 
establish the offense charged therein or any 
lesser included offense. 
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question to the jury, it is necessary that the prosecution 
present some evidence of every element needed to make out a cause 
of action." Noren, ibid, (citing State v. Romero, 554 P.2d 216 
(Utah 1976)); State v. Striebv, 790 P.2d 98, 100 (Utah App. 
1990), cert, denied, 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990). 
"[U]pon a motion to dismiss . . . for lack of evidence 
[] the trial court does not consider the weight of the evidence 
or credibility of the witnesses, but determines the naked legal 
proposition of law ....•• Rivenburgh, 11 Utah 2d at 110, 355 
P.2d at 698-99 (1960) (quoting State v. Penderville, 2 Utah 2d 
281, 186, 272 P.2d 195, 198 (1954)). 
"The controlling principle is that upon [a motion to 
dismiss] the evidence is to be viewed most favorably to the 
state, and if when so viewed, the jury acting fairly and 
reasonably could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt, the judge is required to submit the case to the jury for 
determination of the quilt or innocence of defendant." State v. 
Iverson, 10 Utah 2d 171, 173, 350 P.2d 152, 153 (1960) (emphasis 
added)• 
A challenge alleging insufficient evidence to warrant 
sending a case to the jury is reviewed under the same standard 
applied to a claim that insufficient evidence exists to support a 
3
 Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-3 (1990), provides: 
When it appears to the court that there is 
not sufficient evidence to put a defendant to 
his defense, it shall forthwith order him 
discharged. 
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jury verdict. State v. Dibello, 780 P.2d 1221, 1225 (Utah 1989) 
(cited for this proposition in State v. Taylor, 818 P.2d 561, 
573-74 (Utah App. 1991): "[The appellate court] will uphold the 
trial court's decision if, upon reviewing the evidence and all 
inferences that can be reasonably drawn from it, [the appellate 
court] concludefs] that some evidence exists from which a 
reasonable jury could find that the elements of the crime had 
been proven beyond a reasonable doubt." Ibid, (rejecting the 
defendant's claim that the trial court had erred in denying his 
motion to dismiss)). 
Since the trial court's determination concerning a 
motion to dismiss is a question of law, Rivenburgh, 11 Utah 2d at 
110, 355 P.2d at 698-99, it is subject to a correction of error 
standard. Citv of Monticello, 788 P.2d at 516. 
In State v. Thatcher, 108 Utah 63, 157 P.2d 258 (1945), 
the defendant had been charged with involuntary manslaughter 
stemming from an automobile accident in which there was 
conflicting evidence as to whether the defendant had recklessly 
caused the accident. The trial court granted the defendant's 
motion to dismiss at the conclusion of the State's case, and the 
State appealed. In finding the evidence sufficient to make out a 
prima facie case and in reversing the trial court's ruling, the 
majority stated the proper functions of the trial court versus 
the jury: 
When different reasonable inferences can be 
drawn from the evidence, the question is one 
exclusively within the province of the jury. 
It is not the function of the court to 
10 
substitute its judgment on questions of fact 
for that of the jury. 
Id. at 68/ 157 P.2d at 260 (emphasis added). This distinction 
was developed at length in the concurring opinion of Justice 
Wolfe, instructive in the instant case: 
. . . The rule which must be applied upon a 
motion to dismiss a criminal case is that all 
reasonable inferences are to be taken in 
favor of the state, and only if the record 
itself reveals that no reasonable man could 
draw an inference of guilt therefrom is the 
trial court justified in taking the case from 
the jury. No such situation is revealed by 
this record. 
So important is it that the above be 
understood and that there be no confusion 
regarding it that it may perhaps pay to 
resort again to first principles. It is 
common place in our system of jurisprudence 
that the court decides only questions of law 
and the jury questions of fact. Each has its 
judging functions and each is an equally 
important department of the judicial 
institution we call the court. Neither is 
supposed to trespass in the province of the 
other. This is so fundamental that no 
authority need be cited for it. In this case 
it is requisite that we determine the line 
separating the functions of each. Ordinarily 
we sav that it is for the jury and not the 
court to 'weigh' the evidence. That means 
that where there is any substantial evidence 
to go to the jury in favor of both sides it 
must go to the jury so that the jury may put 
all the evidence for one party on one scale 
and balance it against the evidence for the 
other party placed on the other scale. 
• • • • 
The judge has very little to do with this 
process. He determines whether offered 
testimony has any probative force, i.e., 
whether it tends to prove or disprove an 
element of the case and according to that 
judgment he admits or rejects it. Once 
admitted it is for the jury. 
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There are, of course, situations under 
which the case should not be submitted to a 
jury. One of these would be where there was 
no substantial evidence (and that does not 
mean a substantial amount of evidence but 
substantial in the sense of having 
substance). Perhaps also in the rare case 
where there can be no doubt that testimony of 
all witnesses as to one or more essential 
elements in the case appears from the record 
to be so inherently improbable that no 
reasonable man could give weight to it the 
case could be taken from the jury. But 'mere 
contradictions of the testimony of a witness 
will not suffice to constitute inherent 
improbability or to destroy its weight' so as 
to justify a court in disregarding such 
testimony. Perhaps in the case where there 
is a mountain of evidence on one side as 
against a molehill on the other all of equal 
quality as shown by the record so that no 
jury of reasonable men could determine 
otherwise than for the preponderance the case 
might be taken from the jury, but the 
preponderance would have to be overwhelming. 
Also in criminal cases the case may be taken 
from the jury where it can be said beyond 
doubt that no reasonable men could find the 
defendant guilty without entertaining a 
reasonable doubt. 
In determining whether or not a case is 
to go to the jury, the trial judge has no 
discretion. If the evidence falls into one 
of the above enumerated categories the judge 
should not submit it to the jury. If the 
evidence under any reasonable interpretation 
would sustain a verdict of guilty, the judge 
is reguired to let the case go to the jury. 
Id. at 74-78, 157 P.2d at 263-64 (Wolfe, J., concurring) 
(citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
Defendant argued both at trial and in his written 
12 
motion to dismiss* that the State had presented insufficient 
evidence to make a prima facie case of aggravated assault, 
relying only on authority in which the prosecution had failed to 
prove that "serious bodily injury" had actually occurred, as 
required under Utah Code Ann, § 76-5-103(1)(a) (1990), or its 
predecessor statutes.5 
* At the close of all the evidence defendant also moved for 
a directed verdict of acquittal and, following the jury's 
verdict, submitted only a written motion to dismiss (T. 439; R. 
199-205). Neither the criminal code nor the rules of criminal 
procedure provide for a "directed verdict of acquittal," though 
rule 23, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure does appear to 
contemplate the trial court's right to enter a "judgment of 
acquittal." Utah R. Crim. P. 23. But see State v. Striebv, 790 
P.2d 98, 100 (Utah App. 1990) (stating that Utah Code Ann. § 77-
17-3 (1990), and rule 17(o), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, 
provide for a judgment of acquittal where the prosecution has 
failed to present sufficient evidence for its case in chief); 
State v. Smith, 675 P.2d 521, 524 (Utah 1983) (holding that 
motions for directed verdicts in criminal proceedings are 
governed by sectionp 77-17-3 and rule 17(o)). 
However, this Court has ruled that "[i]n Utah, a judge may 
not acquit a defendant after a jury returns a guilty verdict." 
State v. Larsen, 834 P.2d 586, 589 (Utah App. 1992). Thus, it 
would appear that defendant received undeserved consideration in 
the trial court's even considering his motion for a directed 
verdict of acquittal. In any event, defendant has not indicated 
that any different standard would be applied to consideration of 
his motion for a directed verdict than to his motion to dismiss. 
Indeed, the unfortunate recognition of a "motion for a directed 
verdict" in a criminal case, and the blurring of any distinction 
between it and a motion to dismiss under section 77-17-3 and rule 
17(o), under Striebv and Smith, make clear that both motions are 
evaluated under the same standards. 
5
 See defendant's trial argument (T. 423-30) and Memorandum 
in Support of Motion to Dismiss (R. 199-204), collectively citing 
State ex rel. Besendorfer, 598 P.2d 742, 743-44 (Utah 1977) (no 
serious bodily injury under section 76-5-103(1)(a) where victim 
was struck in the face by the defendant with his fists, 
sustaining bruises and tooth damage); State v. Kakarikos, 45 Utah 
470, 474-77, 146 P. 750, 752-53 (1915) (finding an instruction 
defining "great bodily harm" harmless where the instruction was 
superfluous and the definition of assault was "an unlawful 
attempt, coupled with a present ability to commit a violent 
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In this case, however, defendant was charged with 
knowingly and intentionally committing aggravated assault (R. 1), 
and the jury so instructed (R. 175), only under subsection 
(l)(b), which provides: 
(1) A person commits aggravated assault if he 
commits assault as defined in 
Section 76-5-1026 and he: 
(b) uses . . . . other means or force 
likely to produce death or serious bodily 
injury. 
In State v. Peterson, 681 P.2d 1210 (Utah 1984), the 
defendant appealed his conviction for aggravated assault under 
the same misapprehension as defendant in this case. In Peterson, 
the defendant was first charged only under section 
injury on the person of another," and noting that such injury 
could result from a beating with fists); State v. Harper, 761 
P.2d 570, 571 (Utah App. 1988) (victim hospitalized for nine days 
and permanently disfigured from husband's beating her with his 
fists); State v. Dumas, 721 P.2d 502, 505 (Utah 1986) 
(indisputable that victims beaten with a club and flashlight and 
who were badly bruised and cut, one needing sixty-five stitches 
in his head, suffered serious bodily injury); State v. Poteet, 
692 P.2d 760, 764 (Utah 1986) (victim beaten into unconsciousness 
and who could have died, according to physician, sustained 
serious bodily injury). 
6
 Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102 (1990), provides, in pertinent 
part: 
(1) Assault is: 
(c) an act, committed with unlawful 
force or violence, that causes bodily 
injury to another. 
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76-5-102(1)(a), which requires proof of serious bodily injury. 
On the second day of trial the court granted the State's motion 
to amend the information so that subsection (l)(b), rather than 
(l)(a)/ would be the basis of the aggravated assault charges. 
The defendant in Peterson claimed that the evidence did 
not support a conviction, relying on arguments very similar to 
those made by defendant on appeal in this case, i.e., the victim 
had not sustained any serious bodily injury because she did not 
require any medicial attention after the assault, nor did she 
suffer any permanent disfigurement or protracted loss of bodily 
function. .Id., at 1218-19. In rejecting the defendant's claim 
that the trial court erred in denying his motion to reduce the 
charges to simple assault, the Utah Supreme Court held: 
It is not necessary to prove that death or 
serious bodily injury occurred, but only that 
the actor used means or force likely to have 
that result. The record shows that defendant 
attacked Sandra Dotson, placed his hands 
around her neck and applied sufficient 
pressure to cause her to black out. Such 
force clearly could have caused the death or 
serious bodily injury of Mrs. Dotson and was 
therefore sufficient under the statute. It 
is not necessary to prove that death or 
serious bodily injury occurredr but only that 
the actor used means or force likely to have 
that result. The record shows that defendant 
attacked Sandra Dotson, placed his hands 
around her neck and applied sufficient 
pressure to cause her to black out. Such 
force clearly could have caused the death or 
serious bodily injury of Mrs. Dotson and was 
therefore sufficient under the statute. 
Id. at 1219 (emphasis added). 
In this case both Lott and Nicole Stickney, an 
impartial witness, testified that defendant first struck him 
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twice in the head from behind (T. 114, 170). When Lott tried to 
escape defendant pursued him and then kicked him twice directly 
in the face (T. 114-17). Dr. Gruwell testified that Lott had 
sustained at least one blow to his temple, evidenced by injuries 
to Lott's ear and the swelling in his temporal region, and that 
such a blow could have caused serious bodily injury, requiring 
Lott to undergo an open brain operation and leaving him with 
residual neurological problems (T. 194-95). Gruwell also stated 
that a blow to the temple could cause arterial bleeding leading 
to death within twenty-four hours if not treated (T. 294 ).7 On 
such facts, viewed most favorably to the State, the jury might 
reasonably have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that 
defendant had assaulted Lott by means or force sufficient to 
cause serious bodily injury. Therefore, the trial court properly 
submitted the case to the jury. 
POINT II 
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT 
DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION OF AGGRAVATED ASSAULT. 
In order to successfully challenge the jury's verdict, 
a defendant must demonstrate to the reviewing court that the 
7
 Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601 (1990) defines "serious bodily 
injury:" 
(10) "Serious bodily injury" means bodily 
injury that creates or causes serious 
permanent disfigurement, protracted loss or 
impairment of the function of any bodily 
member or organ, or creates a substantial 
risk of death. 
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evidence and its inferences are so "inconclusive or inherently 
improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of which 
he was convicted." State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 
1983). In undertaking such review, the appellate court will 
"view the evidence, along with the reasonable inferences from it, 
in the light most favorable to the verdict." State v. Moore, 802 
P.2d 732, 738 (Utah App. 1990) (citation omitted). "[S]o long as 
some evidence and reasonable inferences support the jury's 
findings, [the court] will not disturb them. See State v. 
Booker, 709 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah 1985)." Ibid. As noted above, 
this standard is the same as that applied to a motion to dismiss. 
See Dibello, 780 P.2d 1225. 
To meet this burden, defendant must marshal all the 
evidence in support of the verdict and then demonstrate that even 
viewing it in the light most favorable to the verdict, the 
evidence is insufficient to support the verdict. Failure to so 
marshal the evidence waives an appellant's right to have his 
claim of insufficiency considered on appeal. Moore, 802 P.2d at 
738-39. 
In this case defendant fails to marshal the evidence in 
support of the jury's verdict, i.e., Dr. Gruwell's testimony as 
to the signficance of the blows Lott suffered and the serious 
injury and possible death which might have resulted from the blow 
to the temporal region of Lott's head. Such evidence and the 
reasonable inferences from it, as argued in Point I of this 
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brief, when viewed most favorably to the jury's verdict, is not 
so inconclusive or inherently improbable that a reasonable juror 
must have had a reasonable doubt about defendant's using force or 
means likely to cause death or serious bodily injury. Therefore, 
this Court should not disturb the jury's verdict on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the State requests that 
defendant's conviction be affirmed. 
DATED this / day of March, 1993. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
/^Y i>L-4)y^~X~e>^ 
KENNETH A. BRONSTON 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the 
foregoing brief of Appellee was mailed, postage prepaid, to 
Donald E. Elkins, Elkins and Associates, attorneys for defendant, 
60 East 100 South, Suite 100, Provo, Utah 84606, this / day of 
March 1993. 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED (1990) 
76-1-601 
(10) "Serious bodily injury" means bodily 
injury that creeates or causes serious 
permanent disfigurement, protracted loss or 
impairment of the function of any bodily 
member or organ, or creates a substantial 
risk r* death. 
76-5-102 
(1) Assault is: 
• • • • 
(c) committed with unlawful 
force or violence, that causes bodily 
injury to another 
76-5-103(]){ ) 
(1) A person commits aggravated assault if 1le 
commits assault as defined in Section 
76-5-102 and he: 
• • • • 
(b) uses . . . . other means or force 
likely to prt minn i < death or serious bodi ly 
injury. 
77-17-3 
When it appears to the court that there is 
not sufficient evidence to put a defendant 
his defense,, it shall forthwith order him 
discharged. 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
Rule " 
(< " the conclusion of the evidence by the 
prosecution, or at the conclusion of all the 
evidence, the court may issue an order 
dismissing any information or indictment, or 
any count thereof, upon the ground that the 
evidence is not legally sufficient to 
establish the offense charged therein or any 
lesser included offense. 
Rule 23 
At ai ly time prior ; w,u imposition of sentence, the 
court upon its own initiative may, or upon motion of a 
defendant shall, arrest judgment if the facts proved « 
admitted do not constitute a public offense, or the 
defendant is mentally ill, or there is other good cause 
for the arrest of judgment. Upon arresting judgment the 
court may, unless a judgment of acquittal of the 
offense charged is entered or jeopardy has attached, 
order a commitment until the defendant is charged anew 
or retried, or may enter any other order as may be just 
and proper under the circumstances. 
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T H E F 0 U R T H J U D 1 C 1 A L D I S T R 1 C T C Q U R I 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE niiF UTAH : RULING ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
TO DISMISS OR IN THE 
ALTERNATIVE MOTION FOR 
Plaint!It, DIRECTED VERDICT OF ACQUITTAL 
Case No. 911400406 
DAN L. HERRING, : Judge Ray M. Harding 
DOB: 12-18-68 
Defendantf~x 
r
 (nit In-1 hearing 
on Defendant's Motioi ^ Dismiss the alternative Motion for 
Directed Verdict of Acquittal on March 20, 1992 before the 
Honorable Ray M. Harding. The state app* > d 
by Deputy Utah County Attorneys John I Allan and Phillip W. 
Ilii Il I" in i" I 11 ^fendanl appeared and was represented by counsel 
I * John Musselman. The Court, having received and react 
memorandum of both parties, entertained the arguments of counsel, 
^emises n i .,- makes the following 
Ruling: 
t
 -* established a prima facie case for 
Aggravated 
S7v" r:r vrAH 
55 n '92 
2. That the evidence offered for each element of the 
offense charged was such that reasonable minds could find all the 
elements of the crime charged in favor of the State. 
3. That the defendant's Motion to Dismiss the charge of 
Aggravated Assault is denied. 
4. That the defendant's Motion for Directed Verdict of 
Acquittal with respect to the charge of Aggravated Assault is 
denied. 
DATED this 7 day of /&&**<£ , 1992. 
Approved as to form: 
vB^Zoohn Musselman 
Attorney for Defendant 
